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Europe currently faces two major labour market issues relevant for EMU. Firstly, 
there is a need to bring down the relatively high unemployment rate to avoid a shift in 
the political preferences in some member countries away from price stability to 
employment-creating but inflationary monetary policy. Secondly, there is a need for 
greater flexibility in the labour markets, which national governments have been 
reluctant to introduce in the face of strong political opposition. Recent developments 
in some member states seem to have moved in the wrong direction, rendering labour 
markets more rigid. This study examines what will be the effects on flexibility of the 
French law reducing the legal weekly working time and what this may mean for EMU. 
 
Very little literature examines the types of measures required to increase labour 
market flexibility going beyond wage flexibility and labour mobility, the main factors 
suggested by Robert Mundell, who pioneered optimum currency area theory in 1961. 
There are, however, a number of elements of flexibility that can contribute to the 
improvement of the eurozone’s capability to adjust to an asymmetric exogenous 
shock while minimising the employment effects. This paper identifies what other 
types of changes would contribute to the increase in labour market flexibility required 
to ensure EMU sustainability, and whether the new French approach contributes to 
the solution of the problem, or makes matters worse. 
 
The study first looks at the theoretical significance of labour markets in a monetary 
union, and then proceeds to construct a framework for the analysis of the 
employment effects of working time reductions before reviewing the analytical 
literature on this topic. The third chapter defines the elements of flexibility that can be 
influenced with a view to increasing EMU sustainability, finally analysing the 
provisions of the Aubry law in the light of the preceding definitions with the help of a 
simple NAIRU model.  
 
The report comes to a result running counter to the common perception of the French 
initiative, which is that the law simply imposes an additional constraint on the 
country’s labour market. While a rigidifying effect cannot be denied, it also provides Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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for a number of measures that may well bring about a greater degree of flexibility. 
This raises the possibility that the legislation in question is in fact a Trojan horse 
policy, sold to the public on the basis of its (limited) employment-creating effects but 
really designed to create a suppler labour market. If this conclusion is an accurate 
reflection of reality, then the news for EMU is good: Despite public opposition to 
increased flexibility, it may well be achievable. The elimination of some rigidities may 
necessitate the introduction of a new one, but this give-and-take practice may allow 
governments to render their labour markets apt to respond to the requirements posed 
upon them by monetary union. 




When EMU was launched in 1999, few economists doubted that in order to ensure its 
long run sustainability, a number of reforms of member states’ economies were 
necessary. It was hoped that membership of the single currency would accelerate 
efforts to restructure and lead to more efficiently functioning markets in Euroland. 
Reform was most fervently advocated for the currency zone’s labour markets, 
perceived as too rigid to be a viable replacement of the exchange rate as an 
adjustment mechanism. Only increased labour market flexibility could ensure EMU’s 
ability to withstand a shock affecting its member regions asymmetrically, and member 
states’ policies were expected to move in this direction. 
 
Because labour market reforms are politically very difficult to implement, however, 
governments have been reluctant to introduce wide-ranging reforms. For them, more 
immediate national considerations matter much more than the European-level single 
currency and therefore take priority. The question one can ask, then, is whether 
recently introduced labour market policies in various member states take sufficient 
account of the requirements EMU poses. Do they simply focus on the short-run 
interests of national politicians excessively concerned with the (laudable) goal of 
reducing unemployment, but overlooking the need for greater flexibility in the 
process? 
 
Thus far, most labour market policies in Europe have indeed tended to target the 
reduction of unemployment, while the unpopular issue of flexibility has played a minor 
role at best. Although measures to reduce the jobless rate tend to bring with them a 
greater degree of flexibility, some legislation still seems to be moving the wrong way 
by introducing additional rigidities, such as the laws on the reduction of working time 
recently passed in France and Italy. While the latter is a voluntary arrangement, the 
former is compulsory and includes a significant number of accompanying measures 
likely to have a wide-ranging effect on the French labour market. The present study 
takes a qualitative look specifically at this piece of legislation to examine what 
consequences it will have on the French labour market and what implications this has 
for EMU. To this end, it considers only in passing the law’s likely effects on 
unemployment, which is just one of two labour market aspects related to EMU’s Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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sustainability. It is particularly concerned with a rather neglected area of research, 
namely the law’s consequences for labour market flexibility and the part it plays 
in the long run fate of the currency union via that channel. 
 
In order to examine the ways in which the new legislation could have an impact on 
the adjustment capacity of the French labour market, it proved necessary to first 
define the notion of flexibility, which is often characterised in a simplified form as 
consisting of wage flexibility and labour mobility. This definition is not sufficient for the 
analysis presented here and a wider, more comprehensive interpretation is applied 
with the help of a NAIRU-model of the labour market which is then used to inform on 
the ways in which the law will affect flexibility. The conclusions drawn from the 
analysis are rather surprising, and encouraging for EMU.  
 
The first chapter of this paper recalls the significance of labour market flexibility in the 
analytical framework of optimum currency area theory and gives an overview of the 
law; the second chapter analyses what the policy’s likely effects are in terms of 
unemployment. The third chapter develops a comprehensive definition of flexibility in 
all its relevant elements, which is then used in chapter four to examine how the 
individual components are affected by the legislation.  
 Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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Chapter 1: Monetary Union and Labour Markets 
 
•  The theoretical framework for the analysis of EMU 
 
Analysis of Economic and Monetary Union has usually been based on the application 
of the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), pioneered in 1961 by Robert 
Mundell. This theory has evolved significantly over time, with new additions to it 
dating back mainly to more recent years. It specifies what conditions must be met by 
a group of regions or countries wishing to enter into a sustainable regime of mutually 
fixed exchange rates. Only if the criteria are met would the currency area be ‘optimal’, 
or sustainable in the long run.  
 
OCA Theory is based on the central concept of ‘asymmetric shocks’ –  shocks with 
different effects on different countries or regions – and their implications for the role 
of the exchange rate. By definition, a single currency area or a fixed exchange rate 
regime cannot resort to exchange rate changes to adjust to shocks affecting its 
members in different ways. As a result, complete absence of idiosyncratic shocks 
would automatically render a currency area ‘optimal’. The existence of such shocks, 
however, does not mean that a group of regions or countries cannot adopt a common 
monetary (and exchange rate) policy, as long as there are appropriate mechanisms 
to allow regions affected by a negative asymmetric shock to adjust to it without 
resorting to an exchange rate change. OCA Theory describes these adjustment 
mechanisms. 
 
Three elements of the theory are usually regarded as the core of what is a collection 
of many individual criteria added over time by individual authors. Mundell’s own 
criterion is that of labour mobility and flexibility of wages, to which we will return 
below. 
 
McKinnon (1963) suggested that the degree of trade openness with the other 
countries of the currency area should be added to the theory, the idea being that the Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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greater the amount of goods traded, the more harmful any change in the exchange 
rate due to the ensuing destabilising effect on prices. The more open a country, the 
less useful is a devaluation to regain competitiveness because of its tendency to 
create inflationary pressures via import prices. The exchange rate is then not a useful 
tool for adjustment and can be given up.  
 
Kenen (1969) posited that the smaller the degree of production diversification in an 
economy, the more desirable an independent exchange rate policy would be. The 
incidence of a shock on one particular industry sector will be smaller if the economy 
consists of a larger number of sectors. If, on the other hand, production was not 
diversified at all and the economy consisted of only one sector, the incidence of 
adverse shocks on the country would be total.  
 
McKinnon’s criterion is useful to establish in which cases independent monetary and 
exchange rate policies are desirable. However, it does not help us in establishing the 
ex-post process of shock adjustment and is therefore no longer relevant in the 
context of EMU sustainability. Kenen provides a criterion for the minimisation of the 
incidence of asymmetric shocks, but not a useful framework for short-run adjustment 
to them
1. At a time when EMU is reality, the only criterion allowing us to evaluate the 
effectiveness of adjustment mechanisms under monetary union is Mundell’s, and 
related to the labour market. 
 
The labour market in Optimum Currency Area Theory 
 
The main adjustment mechanism under a fixed exchange rate regime described by 
Mundell (1961) is that of wage flexibility to respond to shocks with an asymmetric 
impact on demand across the currency area. The argument is based on a simple 
analysis of supply, demand and the role of prices in a perfectly competitive market.
2 
Thus, if demand suddenly shifted away from the products of Country A towards 
Country B’s products, this would cause output in Country A to fall and unemployment 
                                                 
1 Note that in the medium to long run, the diversification of product markets remains one way of 
adjusting to a shock. The most dangerous shocks are then those requiring short run adjustment, and 
the only mechanism here would be adjustment through a flexible labour market. 
2 The mechanism described in the following two paragraphs is based on de Grauwe (1997). Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
  5
to rise. The increased rate of unemployment will cause workers to moderate their 
wage claims and therefore result in a relatively cheaper labour force in Country A. In 
Country B, on the other hand, the increased demand for the goods it produces 
causes unemployment to decrease and as a result, its employers are faced with 
workers claiming higher remuneration. This process will make goods produced in 
Country A more competitive (the cheaper labour costs can be fed through into lower 
prices), while the reverse is true for Country B.  The overall effect of this mechanism 
is the same as that of an exchange rate adjustment: demand for the two countries’ 
products is rebalanced; wage adjustments allow both economies to return to current 
account equilibrium. A sufficient degree of wage flexibility therefore renders a 
currency area optimal by allowing it to adjust to shocks and prevent long run 
disequilibria.  
 
The second criterion proposed by Mundell is that of interregional (in the case of EMU, 
international) labour mobility. This can be either an alternative of insufficiently flexible 
wages or a result of large wage differences between countries. Thus, to stay in the 
two-country framework used above, reducing the shortage of labour could alleviate 
upward wage pressures in Country B.  All that needs to happen is for unemployed 
workers from Country A to move to Country B. This would help both countries: 
Country A would have less unemployed people, thus the wage would not have to fall 
as much to return to equilibrium. Country B, in turn, experiences less upward 
pressure on wages, enabling it also to remain at equilibrium. In this context, 
McKinnon has noted that labour mobility could be replaced by capital mobility, not 
necessitating workers to move but allowing production to move to other countries. 
This, however, is a viable alternative only in the long run. 
 Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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Labour market flexibility, unemployment and EMU 
 
Krugman and Obstfeld (1996) summarise a number of studies which show that 
labour mobility in Europe is much lower than within the US and cite cultural and 
linguistic differences between countries as a major part of the explanation.  
 
Since the criterion of labour mobility is largely discarded as a large-scale adjustment 
mechanism in Europe, at least for now, concerns focus on the flexibility of labour 
markets, and especially wages, to establish whether EMU is sustainable in its current 
form. While wages in Europe could not be considered upward rigid, a number of 
studies confirm the general view that the converse is true. Abraham (1994)
3 finds that 
a fall in productivity of one point translated into a fall in wages of only 0.29 points and 
finds little or no relation between regional wage levels and the unemployment rates. 
Even a change in regional unemployment rates does not seem to cause sufficient 
wage adjustments to absorb a negative shock. There does not, therefore, seem to be 
sufficient downward flexibility of wages to ensure that Euroland is an optimum 
currency area – thus, EMU may not be sustainable given the current structure of 
member states’ economies. 
 
Downward rigidity of wages, especially in the short run, is blamed mainly on the 
negotiated nature of wages, which are laid down in wage contracts, often for several 
years, making short run wage variations impossible. In the long run, real wages can 
be lowered to a certain extent mainly in Northern European countries, where labour 
markets are characterised by their consensus-based approach to wage setting. It is 
most difficult to change wages in the Southern European countries. Notable 
exceptions to this taxonomy are France and Germany, who are also both 
characterised by very downward rigid wages. Most observers estimate that in these 
countries, a large part of unemployment is caused by institutional rigidities such as 
burdensome wage negotiations and employment regulations rendering labour 
markets less flexible. 
 
                                                 
3 as referenced in Erkel-Rousse (1997) Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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Europe currently faces two major labour market issues relevant for EMU. Firstly, 
there is a need to bring down the relatively high (both historically and in OECD cross-
country comparison) unemployment rate to avoid a shift in the political preferences in 
some EMU countries away from price stability to employment-creating but inflationary 
monetary policy. Seeing that a homogeneous shift of these preferences in all 
countries is unlikely, this would almost certainly lead to the demise of EMU.  
 
Secondly, there is a need for greater ‘flexibility’ in the labour markets. This is a 
generally ill defined notion, but its general meaning in relation to OCA Theory is that 
those shocks formerly counteracted by exchange rate adjustments are now subject 
to adjustment via the labour market. Flexibility is, then, given if labour markets 
adjust to new demand conditions without producing large amounts of long-
term unemployment. This would essentially entail low costs of job shedding (and 
therefore of new employment), low tax and social security payments on labour and 
low barriers to entry into employment. (For a more detailed definition, refer to chapter 
3.) It is important to note that such greater flexibility is not a requirement only thrown 
up by membership of EMU. There is evidence that even before EMU, shocks were 
not usually homogeneous within the same national territory, but rather affecting 
specific sectors across several countries at the same time (i.e., individual countries 
did not constitute OCAs). In this case, the exchange rate would never have been of 
much use and the case for labour market flexibility is even greater as even a re-
introduction of national currencies would be unlikely to solve the problem of 
asymmetric shocks. 
 
These findings have caused a range of economists, employers and especially the 
European Central Bank to make calls for labour market reforms increasingly loudly. 
Such reforms are seen as essential to ensure the sustainability of EMU. As has been 
shown, the problem is twofold and concerns both the level of unemployment itself, 
and the readiness of Euroland labour markets to adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. 
Reforms ensuring a move towards such a ‘flexible’ labour market with low 
unemployment rates conflict with political problems: while everyone agrees that the 
reduction of unemployment should be at the top of policymakers’ agendas, the views 
on the ways in which to attain this goal vary widely. Since labour market flexibility is 
regarded with a lot of suspicion by the general public, who fear that they will be Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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condemned to lower wages, reduced job security and even short spells of 
unemployment, moves towards this goal are politically very difficult to put into 
practice.  Efforts of policymakers have therefore concentrated on popular reforms 
designed to bring more people to work. Such policies have included the creation of 
publicly subsidised positions and state-funded work contracts in jobs judged to be 
socially useful. 
 
The French and Italian initiatives to implement a 35-hour working week are examples 
of such policies. While the Italian version is a voluntary provision, however, the 
French policy is compulsory and applies to practically all employers. This radical 
approach is hoped to create a large number of jobs without necessarily reducing the 
current income level. In the following, the content of the French legislation is 
analysed in the light of the labour market criterion of the Theory of Optimum 
Currency Areas and its potential implications for the sustainability of EMU are 
examined. In order to do this, a look at the new law and the French labour market in 
general will be useful. 
 
•  The French Unemployment Problem 
 
While unemployment has been an ongoing problem in most European countries 
since the economic downturn marked by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system and the oil shocks, it has been more pronounced in some countries than in 
others. Throughout the 1990s, France has been among those EU countries suffering 
from the highest rates of unemployment. Recently, its jobless rate – although, as 
Figure 1.1 illustrates, now falling steadily – has only been exceeded by that of Spain. 
Indeed, unemployment forms one of the major preoccupations of French politics and 
prompts frequent introductions of new labour market legislation intended to reduce 
the jobless rate. 
 
French Labour Market characteristics 
 
During the recession of the 1990s the effectiveness of the French labour market has 
been called into question. While, according to the European Commission (1997, p. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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2), the general unemployment rate is comparable to that of other EU countries in the 
same cyclical situation, the French unemployment rate has been (slightly) above the 
OECD average since the late 1980s. This is the reason for the high place that 
unemployment reduction takes on the French political agenda. 
 
Graph 1.1: The French unemployment rate (ILO definition) 
Data source: www.travail.gouv.fr/etudes 
 
Unemployment continued to increase without a break from 1968 to 1985, when it fell 
again for the first time before continuing to rise, this time only until 1988. Then, until 
1990, the situation improved before the growth slowdown of the 1990s caused it to 
worsen again. Closely following the cyclical fluctuations of the French economy, the 
unemployment rate peaked at 12.6% in June 1997, before starting to fall again after 
that. In February 2000, it was at 10.2%
4. The OECD (1999a, p. 37) points out that the 
decrease was relatively slow due to the large amount of net labour market entries 
(140,000 per year). 
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However, even when population growth tailed off slightly in the 1980s, the 
unemployment rate continued to increase, following its trend, which started in the first 
half of the 1960s. Since 1988, the working age population has continued to increase 
at rates between 100,000 and 200,000 annually due to demographic factors, labour 
market re-entry following a decrease in the unemployment rate, and employment 
policies with an influence on the activity rates of certain groups of the population, 
especially youth training schemes. 
 
While the rate of unemployment has steadily increased, the employment rate has 
seen a different development: The first oil shock is reflected purely by a slowdown in 
the growth rate of employment, but the rate actually decreased from 1980 to 1986, 
before accelerating again, if not sufficiently to absorb unemployment.  
 
Institutional labour market characteristics and recent policy developments 
 
The European Commission (1997) characterises the French labour market as having 
a comparatively high rate of long-term unemployment, accounting for over 40% of 
total unemployment and with an average duration of 16 months, with half of the long-
term unemployed staying without a job for more than two years
5. This creates a 
burden for the state benefit system. Relatively little attention is paid in policy 
discussions in France to the differentiation between structural and cyclical (Classical 
and Keynesian) unemployment. Yet the OECD (1999b) estimates that structural 
unemployment is currently around 10%. While this has sometimes been blamed on 
restrictive monetary policy, Nickell (1997) believes that “the sheer length of time over 
which European unemployment has been growing is enough to deny a macro 
explanation.”
6 It is thus more likely that the phenomenon can be blamed on a number 
of institutional features of the labour market. Indeed, the OECD (1999b) finds that 
“over-regulation and constraints on competition tend to reduce potential and actual 
growth” (p. 69). An example of rigid labour market regulation are overtime rules, 
restricting both the number of legal overtime hours and establishing minimum 
remuneration requirements (OECD, 1999b, p. 84).  
 
                                                 
5 OECD (1999b), p. 37 
6 As cited in Artis (1998), p. 104 Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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Wages and framework conditions are negotiated between trade unions and 
employers’ federations. Although union density is low (about 10%), trade unions are 
powerful because union coverage is high (catching about 90% of employees). While 
national agreements tend to treat framework conditions, wages are determined on a 
sectoral basis and can be adjusted on the firm-level. On the low-income scale, 
France has an indexed minimum wage (SMIC), which is prescribed by law and can 
be increased as an economic policy measure. It is among the highest minimum 
wages in the EU
7. Non-wage labour costs in France are also among the highest in 
Europe
8, caused mainly by relatively high social security contributions. The tax 
wedge between gross take-home pay and labour cost is between 33 and 43%
9.  
 
As Cohen et al (1997) show, a notable feature of the French labour market is its 
organisation into two separate markets, with short-term (one-year) contracts – 
renewable once and for which separations are relatively easy – on one side, and 
long-term contracts with higher firing costs on the other. “Almost all new entrants 
(mainly young workers, but also female workers) are hired on short-term contracts. 
They are clearly those who experience the higher separation rates. Indeed, French 
society puts all the burden of flexibility on these workers.“ (Cohen et al, 1997, p. 272) 
But while “low firing costs raise younger workers’ separation rates, (they) also 
increase their hiring rates“ (p. 273). An increasing share of employees (now 4% of 
total employment) is using fixed-term contracts, and temporary employment has 
become widespread. These developments are generally interpreted to reflect 
relatively high costs of hiring workers caused by high costs of firing them. Thus, 
companies prefer to opt for contracts with fixed terms allowing them to renege on 
severance entitlements. This development is continuing, as “four-fifths of the jobs 
created in 1998 took the form of short-term contracts“ (The Economist, 2000, p. 20). 
According to the OECD (1999b), it is precisely this “promotion of temporary and part-
time work which (has…) contributed to employment growth” (p. 56). 
 
Another specificity is the high level of youth unemployment
10 (about 25% of young 
people under 25 are unemployed), with considerable degrees of geographical 
                                                 
7 Dohse and Krieger-Boden (1998), p. 145 
8 Dohse and Krieger-Boden (1998), p. 146 
9 The exact rate depends on employees’ tax status (marital status, total income etc.). Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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concentration. First employment for young people now takes longer to find and is less 
durable: 44% of working young people are on temporary, apprenticeship, fixed-term 
or state-financed contracts. Policies focusing on the educational system have aimed 
to reduce the number of school-leavers without a qualification, whose chances of 
finding a job were three times lower than those of youths with a school-leaver 
certificate. Secondary education is being restructured to become more focused on 
the future professional life of pupils.  
 
A less-than-average development of part-time work, a social security system exerting 
a heavy weight on indirect labour costs and low-skilled labour in particular, and the 
relatively poor development of both business and consumer services are further 
features of the French labour market. Tax incentives have been used to promote the 
utilisation of part-time working, although the number of people stating that they work 
involuntarily in this way is much higher in France than in other countries using this 
working practice. 
 
The successive French governments have not been inactive in implementing policies 
intended to bring down unemployment. Intervention has often been justified by the 
country’s low degree of collective bargaining practices (Cette, 1998), leading to 
outcomes regarded as socially suboptimal. A large number of initiatives have caused 
an increase in public spending on employment from 0.9% of GDP in 1973 to 3.9% in 
1996, while the number of persons covered by subsidy schemes increased from 0.1 
million to 2.2 million in the same period (OECD, 1999a, p. 51).  
 
More recent policy developments have focused on the reduction of social 
contributions especially on low-skilled labour. A regressive rebate, proportional to the 
number of hours worked and applicable for workers paid up to 1.3 times the minimum 
wage (SMIC), was introduced in 1996 and reduced the cost of labour by 12.6% (see 
Table 4.1 below). 
 
A striking characteristic of French labour market reforms is that they tend to face 
significant social opposition. Political difficulties continue to mean that while some 
reforms appear to be a step in the right direction, the opposite seems to be true in 
                                                                                                                                                         
10 The following paragraphs are based on OECD (1999a). Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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others. Thus, rather than lowering unemployment benefit payments, they were 
increased and the period of eligibility for benefits was lengthened, thereby potentially 
discouraging a quicker and more effective job search on the part of the unemployed. 
 
While employment protection legislation is already relatively high in France, there are 
plans to reinforce such provisions even further to reduce the chances of 
redundancies. In addition, compulsory redundancy payments for persons over the 
age of 50 have been increased, thus reducing the likelihood of the older unemployed 
to be hired. Redundancy plans have to be accompanied by retraining schemes, 
further increasing the cost of job shedding.  
 
In order to reduce youth unemployment, the current socialist government has 
introduced a scheme which aims to employ young people aged between 18 and 25 in 
community service jobs which would otherwise have been provided by neither the 
public nor the private sector. Other policies include the provision of skills training for 
the long-term unemployed, as well as several different programmes seeking to offer 
part-time public sector employment to this social group with the aim of providing them 
with a new opportunity to enter the labour market.  
 
The law on working time reductions 
 
The 35-hour week forms part of the ongoing fight against unemployment. The French 
government has described it as a logical step in the historical evolution: the number 
of hours worked per week has steadily declined over the years. In 1936, the country 
saw the introduction of a 40-hour week, followed by a one-hour reduction in 1982.  
 
In 1996, the Robien law was introduced offering employers reducing their staff’s 
working time by 10 to 15 percent and an analogous increase in their headcount 
generous reductions in social security contributions, applicable to the entire 
workforce. The only condition was that the newly created jobs would be kept for at 
least two years. Similar provisions applied to companies that, after introducing the 
shorter working week, decided not to go ahead with planned redundancies. The 
Robien law, however, was of a voluntary nature and of little success with an 
estimated 34,000 jobs created or saved. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
  14
 
As a result, the new socialist government decided in 1997 to introduce legislation 
making the move to the 35-hour working week compulsory for all companies. Under 
this legislation, the normal working week is reduced from 39 hours to 35, with effect 




11 were given to firms implementing the shorter working week 
before the deadline in the form of a reduction in social security contributions per 
employee whose working time is reduced, and per new job created. These subsidies 
are available for all firms implementing a working time reduction of at least 10 percent 
with a subsequent increase in the headcount of at least 6 percent. They are 
regressive over five years and likely to be maintained at the minimum level of 
assistance after that. 
 
While keeping the maximum yearly limit of overtime hours constant
12, the law, by its 
nature, lowers the limit of normal weekly hours worked above which overtime must 
be paid. 
  
The reduction in working time is intended to be effected without a cut in the wages 
perceived by workers – this would represent an 11.4% increase in wages –, although 
this is not prescribed by the law which foresees that company- or sector-specific 
deals be negotiated between employers and social partners. These negotiations 
would concern the flexibilisation of working times, which would for example allow a 
company to introduce shiftwork enabling it to decrease its downtime due to labour 
market restrictions. This is intended to increase the productivity of French companies, 
making them more competitive. In addition, the annualisation of working time means 
that employers can require employees to work more one week and compensate them 
in terms of fewer hours in another, as long as both are in the same year. If employers 
choose to compensate their workers in additional days of leave, these can be 
credited to a “time savings account” and must be used in the five years following the 
credit.  
                                                 
11 Refer to chapter 4 for details. 
12 For restrictions of this statement, refer to chapter 4. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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The Aubry law is not a simple reduction in the maximum legal normal weekly working 
time; it contains a number of other provisions that may potentially improve the 
working of the labour market. It will be treated in more detail in chapter 4.  Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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Chapter 2: The effects of the 35-hour initiative on the labour market 
 
•  The theoretical framework for the analysis of working time reductions 
 
The French initiative is based upon a simple rule of three. If an imposed reduction of 
the weekly working time is applied to a large part of the economy, work will be ‘freed 
up’ and thus increase firms’ requirements for additional workers. This would result in 
an increased hiring rate, which would, in turn, reduce unemployment. This approach 
poses a number of theoretical problems related to its underlying assumptions. I will 
briefly look at the theoretical arguments to construct an analytical framework, then in 
more detail at some of the points raised, namely the effect of the policy on 
unemployment and on other labour market variables. 
 
The first problem is commonly referred to as the ‘lump of labour fallacy’ and identifies 
the most striking assumption underlying the approach of cutting unemployment 
through a reduction in the working week, namely that the amount of labour available 
in an economy is fixed. Thus, the policy of cutting every individual’s working time by a 
certain percentage and substituting a new employee for the work liberated in this way 
would eventually succeed in reducing the number of people looking for work by 
exactly the same percentage.  In this way, a sufficient cut could theoretically lead to 
full employment. Yet, the pool of labour is never fixed. The labour market is subject to 
a number of flows. More specifically, there are significant flows between the pool of 
unemployed workers looking for a job and those who are not part of the labour force. 
People who have been unemployed for a long time may become discouraged or 
reach retirement age and leave the labour market, while new entrants and re-
entrants frequently move in. The labour market in itself thus constitutes a collection of 
flows, which can be influenced by policy decisions. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Any policy creating a large number of jobs and initially causing a lower 
unemployment rate will result in the re-entry of people having previously left the 
labour market due to discouragement. In this way, while the employment rate will 
increase, the rate of unemployment (defined as the percentage of the working-age Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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population actively seeking employment) will not necessarily decrease by the same 
amount and may even remain largely constant. This argument is further strengthened 
if the supply of labour changes as a result of the introduction of the Aubry law. The 
Lucas critique might apply if the policy influences the expectations relating to job 
search success of the agents with a preference for jobs requiring them to work only 
35 hours a week (but not 39) and as a result causes their unanticipated entry onto 
the labour market. 
 



























        Source: Hart (1987) 
 
 
Analogously to the previous argument, the policy also implies that the amount of 
output – and therefore of work – in an economy is fixed and cannot be increased. 
This is reflected in the way the 35-hour initiative is also referred to: “Work-sharing”. 
From a theoretical point of view, this raises two points. Firstly, the amount of work 
‘available’ in an economy is by no means fixed but typically increases as a result of 
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economic growth (which unambiguously increases output
13). Economic growth, in 
turn, is caused by appropriate policies, such as research and development 
programmes
14. Furthermore, the rate of economic activity will increase with the 
number of entrepreneurs starting up a new business, for example following a tax 
incentive to become self-employed. The present policy can thus be described as a 
‘defensive’ one; it effectively resigns itself to the assumption that the economy is no 
longer able to create more work and thus needs to divide up the amount of available 
work among everybody. Essentially, this is the same as sharing unemployment 
among all members of the working-age population. 
 
Secondly, inherent in the reasoning of the initiative is the perfect divisibility of labour. 
It assumes that a four-hour cut in the working time of one employee will liberate four 
hours of work for another employee. This, however, is only true if the economy is 
structured according to the principles of Taylorism: assembly-line work where, once 
all workers are properly trained, the amount produced does not vary according to the 
time a single worker spends on the task. However, where the speed of production is 
not imposed by the assembly line, a cut in the working time may very well have an 
effect on the amount of work made available. Indeed, the French initiative was partly 
sold by the government on the premise that a reduction in the working week would 
result in an increase in labour productivity, a statement consistent with the concept of 
decreasing marginal productivity of labour. Thus, it may well be the case that a four-
hour reduction in working time liberates significantly less or even no work for another 
person. I will return to the issue of the productivity gains induced by the French policy 
below. 
 
The Aubry law also makes an implicit assumption about the labour force itself, 
namely that labour is homogeneous and that as a result the pool of unemployed will 
include a sufficient number of workers who can fill any newly created posts. In other 
words, “hours and workers are seen as perfect substitutes” (Drèze, 1982, p. 41). 
While this is probably the case in some sectors and especially in low-skilled jobs, it is 
unlikely to be true in others. Yet the law imposes a working time reduction across 
                                                 
13 The negative relationship between output and unemployment is described by Okun’s law. See, for 
example, Mankiw (1992) for a description. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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almost all sectors of the economy, which may result in reduced output in those ones 
experiencing skill shortages, assuming that the law is correctly applied. 
 
Furthermore, for a cut in the weekly hours worked to unambiguously result in an 
increase in employment, the assumption of upward sticky wages and prices must 
hold. If this is not the case, prices and especially wages may adjust to the changed 
supply and demand situations and could counteract the employment-creating effect 
of the work-sharing policy (reduced unemployment will exert upward pressure on 
wages, which in turn will have adverse employment effects). This view, put forward 
by Layard (1986), explains why in France, much emphasis was put on the desire of 
the government to associate the Aubry law with several years’ wage moderation. 
 
Given that such moderation is supported, this implies another assumption, namely 
that workers have a preference for leisure over work, allowing them to increase their 
utility by accepting a wage freeze in return for more leisure. However, when given the 
choice between the current situation and the reduction in working time, the majority 
of workers prefer the status quo, displaying a clear preference for the maintenance of 
their purchasing power rather than their overall utility (Taddei, 1998, p. 6), which 
includes leisure time. 
 
Layard and Nickell (1986)
15 raise another important point arising from considerations 
of the NAIRU model. “If wage setters attempt to set real wages at a level which is 
higher than that which is consistent with employers’ pricing behaviour, the result will 
be ever increasing inflation. Unemployment (…) has therefore got to rise to offset this 
effect”
16 if real wages are set above their NAIRU-consistent equilibrium level as a 
result of a reduced-size unemployment pool following implementation of the Aubry 
law. Eventually, unemployment will return to the NAIRU level. The result would be an 
unchanged quantity of workers, each working four hours less per week. The national 
product in this case would decline as a result of the legislation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
14 Of course, under EMU governments are restricted as to what growth policies they can implement. 
Research and development assistance is one of the policies used by the European Union to 
increase its competitiveness and foster economic growth. 
15 quoted in Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993) 
16 Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993), p. 402 Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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Thus, the French initiative is subject to a substantial number of theoretical criticisms 
concerning its underlying logic. The fact that so many of its inherent assumptions are 
disputed probably means that it will not be as successful as it is hoped. It is, however, 
likely that it will still lead to some employment creation and I will now turn to a short 
analysis of some of the studies which have tried to quantify the policy’s effects. 
 
•  Analysing the French policy’s effects on unemployment 
 
A number of studies have tried to quantify the likely effects of the working time 
reduction on the level of unemployment in France. Before reviewing some of them, it 
is necessary to construct an analytical framework to highlight the factors that need to 
be included in such an exercise. 
 
Naturally, any analysis needs to take into account both the size and the scope of 
application of the working time reduction. The cuts in working time could be very 
small, or amount to a relatively large share of total hours worked, and effects on 
employment would consequently vary according to the magnitude of the reduction. 
Equally, if the initiative concerns only one sector, the job-creating effect on the whole 
economy will be much smaller than a wholesale application across all areas of 
activity. The French policy in particular has been criticised for its all-encompassing 
approach introducing the 35-hour week in two stages.  
 
Productivity is an essential variable to be taken into account in any analysis of 
working time reductions. It is an argument both for the camp in favour of the Aubry 
law and for the camp against. As has been mentioned before, the defenders of the 
policy have argued that a reduction in the number of hours worked would result in 
increased labour productivity, an argument based on two main premises. The first 
one is the decreasing marginal productivity of labour as total hours of work 
increase
17; the second one is that the per capita reduction of hours worked and 
especially the accompanying measures for the flexibilisation of working time 
                                                 
17 This theoretically sound argument seems to be disputed by current developments in the US, where 
“workers work longer than workers in any other industrialised country and are also the most 
productive.” (ILO, 1999, p. 2). This would suggest that the theoretical assumption of decreasing 
marginal productivity of labour does not hold, yet the report goes on to say that productivity growth 
is currently higher in Europe “despite” moves to shorter working weeks. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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arrangements would enable firms to make greater use of their capital equipment, for 
example through the introduction of more shiftwork. This would reduce machine 
downtimes and lead to overall increased productivity of labour due to its higher 
productivity at the margin. 
 
In general, productivity increases are desirable because of their wealth-creating 
effects. In terms of their employment-creating effects, however, their role is disputed. 
As Malaval (1999) points out, a process innovation (such as a reorganisation of 
capital utilisation) where output is fixed will allow savings in factors of production, 
which will reduce demand for labour and therefore employment. The overall effect will 
depend on the innovation’s capacity to reduce the demand for labour and on the 
elasticity of substitution between the two factors of production. If, on the other hand, 
output is not fixed and the increase in productivity allows producers to lower the 
prices of their goods, the consequentially increased demand will allow them to 
increase their production and therefore raise their demand for labour. For this to be 
the case, however, the demand elasticity must be such that the amount of goods 
demanded increases more than the productive capacity following an increase in 
productivity; otherwise there would be no need to hire new workers. Any study 
analysing the potential effects of a working time reduction must therefore make an 
assumption about the magnitude of the productivity gains to be made. If the 
percentage of productivity gains exceeds that of the percentage working time 
reduction, there will be no employment creation (in this particular case, there would 
even be employment destruction). So far I have ignored another important aspect 
which must be seen in conjunction with productivity increases, namely the behaviour 
of wages. 
 
Wages play an important role in a firm’s decision on how much labour to employ. Of 
course, it would be wrong to say that wage levels are the only criterion; there are 
many more relating to the firm’s production structure and alternative factors of 
production. It is common textbook theory that labour demand is a function of the real 
price of labour (W/P) relative to the real price of capital (K/P). In other words, a rise in 
the price of one factor of production will tend to reduce the intensity with which that 
factor is used. Thus a rise in the wage rate relative to the rental cost of capital will 
tend to lead firms to choose more capital-intensive techniques in the long run (Begg 
et al, 1994). As a result, it seems fair to assume that a rise in the wage rate is likely Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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to result in capital-labour substitution and a decrease in the demand for labour, 
although that decrease is likely to be less than proportional. If, however, labour 
productivity increases, thereby increasing the marginal product of labour, the 
equilibrium wage rate will increase proportionally and such a wage rise will not result 
in reduced labour demand. Should wages go up by less than productivity, labour 
demand is even likely to increase. A productivity increase could therefore 
compensate a higher wage rate which may be induced if the French government’s 
calls for wage moderation in conjunction with the working time reduction are not 
heeded or if, as Börsch-Supan (1999) envisages, even with unchanged hourly 
contract wages effective labour costs still increase due to a greater demand for 
overtime work or increased wages due to capital-labour substitution. 
 
Thus, wages must not increase by more than productivity in order for a working time 
reduction to represent a gain for producers and therefore provide them with an 
incentive to employ new workers. As the OECD (1994) points out, there is usually 
great reluctance among workers to accept a wage cut proportional to the reduction of 
their working time. If wages are kept at the pre-reduction rate, as is the aim of the 
French project, it is clear that, ceteris paribus, productivity increases need to 
compensate for the effective increase in unit labour costs (amounting to 11.4%). If 
the working time reduction exceeds the productivity increase
18, a firm faces four 
options
19: 
                                                 
18 where both are expressed in percentage changes 
19 These options have been put forward by Schettkat (1986). Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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1. Reduce output proportionally to the working time reduction  
2. Compensate for the reduction by using more overtime 
3. Compensate for the reduction by using additional labour 
4. Seek further productivity increases to produce the same output using the same 
amount of labour working shorter hours.  
 
The first option sounds improbable, but as Hart (1987) points out, this decision is 
more likely to be taken by small firms who are unable to free up enough work to 
employ an additional person than by large firms who might have less problems to do 
so. Indeed, this seems to be an accurate reflection of events after the last French 
working time reduction in 1982. 
 
A firm is thus not forced to react to a reduction in the legal working time by increasing 
its workforce, and will base its decision on the costs entailed by each option. Hence, 
any study needs to take into account what firms’ decisions may be – a look at the 
different costs is necessary. The French initiative maintains the existing overtime 
wage
20 so as not to increase firms’ incentives to opt for that possibility. At the same 
time, the labour subsidy aims at bringing the costs of the third option down.  
 
Employers face a wide host of fixed costs related only to the number of workers 
employed and not to the amount of time they work. Elliott (1991) distinguishes 
between non-recurring fixed costs related to initial worker training and firing costs. 
Recurring fixed costs are employers’ social security contributions (unemployment and 
health insurance, pension contributions), fringe benefits (canteen, company cars), 
employee care, and most importantly, payment of annual and sick leave. Any 
changes in these fixed costs (especially social security contributions) need to be 
considered in the assessment. 
 
The French law includes provisions for subsidies given to firms hiring additional 
workers as a result of a general working time reduction. It is useful to be clear on how 
much of the cost of hiring a marginal member of staff is picked up by public funds, 
                                                 
20 Except for a transitional period in the first year of the law’s application, when overtime rates are 
lower – refer to Table 4.3 for more details. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
  24
and how much is left to be financed by employers. Clerc (1999)
21 shows this using 
the example of a company originally employing 100 staff and hiring the minimum 
requirement of new employees to be eligible for the subsidy: 6% of the old headcount 
following an hours reduction of 11%. The average annual cost of employing six 
workers is FRF180,000 each; this represents additional costs of FRF1.1m. The 
employer will receive the regressive state subsidy of at least FRF4,000 per year and 
for each worker it employs, not just for the additional six workers, bringing the amount 
of the subsidy to FRF424,000. Hence, the subsidy can pick up about half of the 
higher cost incurred by employers. The rest would need to be compensated through 
one of the mechanisms described above. This shows that the French policy will 
impose some costs on employers, even though it is accompanied by a subsidy 
scheme. This is further confirmed by Taddei (1997), who notes that such a cost 
increase is usually among the features of working time reductions, even if these costs 
are not always apparent right from the entry into force of the new regulation. 
 
•  Predicted employment effects: Empirical studies and previous experience 
 
Several types of studies exist to inform on the potential outcomes of the French 
initiative. Firstly, there are the studies which look at the exact provisions of the law 
and use predictions relating to the underlying economic variables (such as growth) to 
estimate the effects of the policy on unemployment econometrically. Secondly, there 
are purely theoretical studies which treat the regulation, and the third type are 




Estimations by the OFCE
23 dating back to 1993 saw the possibility of the creation of 
2.5 million jobs. The study was based on the assumption of zero productivity gains 
and on cost stabilisation. A 1998 study by the same office foresees a creation of 
810,000 jobs three years after the law’s entry into force, but only a total of 640,000 
after ten years. The analytical scenario was based on zero wage compensation and 
absence of productivity gains from the reorganisation of working methods. With 
                                                 
21 Calculations shown are slightly adapted to reflect final contents of the actual law. 
22 The following three paragraphs are based on a summary in Malaval (1999). 
23 Office français des conjonctures économiques Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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reorganisation and wage increases in line with the ensuing productivity gains, the 
result was even more favourable: 910,000 jobs created. 
 
The government agency DARES
24 estimated a job-creating potential of 700,000 
accompanied by a growth slowdown, based on the following assumptions: Working 
time reduction of 10%; productivity gains of 3.3% with corresponding wage increases; 
a one-point reduction of social security charges per weekly hours reduction; all 
employees are concerned by the reduction. Criticism of this model has focused on its 
optimism, reuniting all favourable hypotheses. The long-term growth slowdown it 
predicts has featured in the arguments of the policy’s opponents, as has the foreseen 
worsening of public finances, and companies’ reduced profit resulting from the 
assumption that the costs of the policy are evenly spread between employers and 
employees. A study compiled by the Bank of France equally predicts 730,000 jobs 
“created or saved”
25 at a horizon of five years.  
 
Conditions for success cited in many studies include the need for wage decreases in 
line with working time, cost neutrality for firms and a reorganisation of working 
practices resulting in machine utilisation times no shorter than before the reduction. 
Because of the fragile nature of the studies’ assumptions, their authors have pointed 
out that they were intended simply to show under which conditions employment 
effects would be maximised, rather than estimating the policy’s effects. The 
discrepancies between the studies’ results are explained by differences in the 
underlying assumptions concerning all the variables laid out in the previous section. 
 
Another range of studies looks at the past experiences with working week reductions. 
The first kind deals with the 1982 reduction of one hour in France, and the second 
kind deals with such initiatives in other countries.  
 
One study of the first kind is Crépon and Kramarz (2000), who attempt to draw 
lessons from previous French experience. In 1982, the one-hour cut was unexpected 
                                                 
24 Direction de l’animation de la recherche, des études et des statistiques 
25 Official assessments of the impact of the Aubry law refer to “jobs created or saved” (emplois créés 
ou préservés), taking into account not only those jobs directly created but also those initially 
planned to be subject to redundancy but subsequently not cut (and thus “saved”) as a result of a 
review of businesses’ employment plans following the implementation of the legislation. This also 
explains why the estimates cannot be compared directly to the reduction in unemployment. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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by firms and followed a 1981 increase in the minimum wage. “These changes in the 
legal framework led to large employment losses. (...) Gains in hourly productivity 
associated with the reduction of hours appear to have been insufficient to 
compensate firms for the increase in hourly pay.” (p. 28) Looking at the current 
initiative, they predict adverse effects for the low-skilled workers paid at minimum 
wage because they do not have any scope for lowering their hourly wage, becoming 
dependent on state subsidies for their job security
26. Cette (1998) warns that while 
the initiative should reduce the Keynesian element of unemployment, it must not 
increase the structural one by increasing production costs.  
 
Hunt (1999) examines the German efforts to introduce sectoral work-sharing 
arrangements from 1985. She finds that the German efforts were accompanied by 
full wage compensation, effectively increasing hourly wages. As a result, the study 
concludes that the policy had a counterproductive effect, actually reducing the level 
of employment. She concludes that “Germany’s work-sharing experiment has 
allowed those who remained employed to enjoy lower hours at a higher hourly wage, 
but likely at the price of lower overall employment” (p. 145). 
 
No matter what the results are of the different studies in terms of employment 
creation, the common denominator is that for the policy to be effective, it must be 
accompanied by wage moderation or at least wage compensation less than 
proportional to the percentage decrease in hours. The French government has called 
for wage moderation, and this seems to have been heeded so far. The policy may 
therefore have an employment-creating effect, albeit a mitigated one. It can only 
have an effect on Keynesian unemployment, which probably amounts to roughly two 
percentage points of the French unemployment rate
27. Seeing that Keynesian 
unemployment may be transformed into Classical unemployment in the longer term, 
it should be clear that the French initiative may be a way of reducing this flow from 
Keynesian to structural unemployment. In order for the Classical element of 
employment to be cut, however, a higher degree of labour market flexibility is likely to 
be needed. This is even truer if the labour market is to become more adjustable in 
                                                 
26 The number of workers being paid the minimum wage is crucial for the assessment of wage 
flexibility. We will return to this idea in chapters 3 and 4. 
27 Cette (1998) estimates a maximum effect of 2 percentage points and examines the policy’s effects 
on Keynesian unemployment. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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the face of asymmetric shocks. The remainder of this study examines the effects of 
the French initiative on flexibility and the next chapter proceeds with the definition of 
this term. 
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Chapter 3: Defining labour market flexibility for EMU 
 
 
Labour market flexibility has been advocated as the solution to making EMU 
sustainable in the face of asymmetric shocks. ‘Flexibility’ is in fact composed of a 
large number of factors, all of which are ideally viewed as complementary. Table 3.1 
gives an overview of the elements of labour market flexibility
28, which are presented 
in more detail in this chapter. 
 
Labour market flexibility can be analysed in a three-level framework, the first of which 
I will label “goal”, which is clearly a sufficient degree of responsiveness to exogenous 
shocks. Borrowing further from monetary policy terminology, the second level gets 
the label “targets” and includes three types of flexibility. Each of these then has a 
number of “instruments” assigned to it; these are the variables which, when changed, 
will have an effect on the degree of flexibility displayed by a particular labour market. 
In the following, each of these “instruments” will be analysed as to its relevance to 
EMU. 
 
The adaptability of aggregate and relative wages refers to the responsiveness of 
wages and non-wage labour costs (see below) in the face of an asymmetric shock on 
the job market. If adaptability is high, wages will adjust to re-equilibrate supply and 
demand on the labour market and minimise the effect on employment. A lack of 
adaptability would hamper this adjustment mechanism and consequently, the 
magnitude of the (negative) effect on employment is positively related to the 
significance of the lack. We can distinguish between aggregate and relative labour 
costs, informing on the capability of the whole economy and the individual sectors of 
production, respectively, to adjust wages. Clearly, aggregate adaptability would only 
be of use if all sectors in one (national) economy were equally hit by an asymmetric 
shock in a greater monetary union. Relative labour costs, then, seem much more 
useful as an adjustment tool in EMU, where shocks are more likely to be sector- 
                                                 
28 The first part of this chapter is based on the comprehensive definition of labour market flexibility 
presented in Dohse and Krieger-Boden (1998). Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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rather than country-specific
29, because they can bring labour markets back to 
equilibrium by signalling where labour demand is highest. 
 
Table 3.1: The elements and hierarchy of labour market flexibility 
 
LEVEL 1 (“Goal”) 
 
Responsiveness to exogenous shocks 
 
 
LEVEL 2 (“Targets”) 
 
•  Labour cost flexibility  
•  Geographical and job mobility 
•  Working time flexibility 
 
 







Labour cost flexibility  •  Adaptability of aggregate and relative 
wages (sectoral, regional, age) 
• Wage  bargaining  system: Trade union 
centralisation and coverage 
•  Hiring and firing costs (caused by 
employment protection legislation) 
• Minimum  wage 
•  Non-wage labour costs 
   
Geographical and job mobility  •  Education and (re)training (Active labour 
market and life-long learning policies) 
•  Policies to increase geographical and 
occupational mobility  
• Income  taxes 
•  Wage compensation (benefit payments) 
   
Working time flexibility  •  Working time regulation: Flexibility on 
(number of) hours and time (of day) and 
spread (over time) 
•  Part-time working, fixed-term  
 
 
                                                 
29 A vast number of studies, such as Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), referenced in Pisani-Ferry 
(1994), have analysed the European shock structure. Most studies find a core of countries 
displaying a strong correlation between national shocks (although this core is not usually congruent 
with the group of countries now forming the euro-11). Given the large degree of diversification in 
most countries’ economies, shocks are more likely to be sector-specific and involve several 
countries simultaneously. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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Regulations on minimum wages reduce (downward) wage flexibility among low-
skilled workers (who perceive the minimum wage, or only slightly more). As a result, 
an idiosyncratic shock affecting a sector with a large number of employees paid at 
the minimum wage will have a larger effect on unemployment than a shock affecting 
a sector where employees are highly paid ex-ante and able to reduce their wage 
claims ex-post. In this sense, minimum wages can have negative employment effects 
because they hamper downward wage adjustment. 
 
Non-wage labour costs are charges incurred by employers when they employ a 
worker, such as social security contributions. Firms’ cost structures are more 
inflexible, the larger the fixed amount of non-wage labour costs. Such charges 
therefore distort prices, hampering a purely market-based allocation of resources, 
especially if an asymmetric shock impacts on the price of labour. 
 
Wage bargaining systems have an impact on the degree of wage flexibility. 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988) posit the theory that either a large degree of centralisation 
of wage bargaining, or a large degree of decentralisation are preferable to an 
intermediary arrangement. The latter would provide actors with too much influence on 
aggregate wage levels while lacking the incentive to consider the macroeconomic 
effects of their wage claims. Labour market performance was thus better in countries 
where the wage bargaining situation corresponded to one of the two extremes. A 
centralised system is said to ensure that wage claims incorporate expectations 
relating to the resulting effects on the whole economy. Decentralised wage 
bargaining, on the other hand, enables wages to be set according to the situation in 
individual companies. In the context of EMU, then, decentralised bargaining systems 
are preferable in the face of sector-specific shocks because the firm-specific wage 
adjustments they allow will minimise the degree of labour market distortion caused by 
an asymmetric shock. It should be noted that the positive employment effects of a 
very centralised wage bargaining system have been disputed. The concept of wage 
drift has been put forward as a reason, whereby the wage deals struck under these 
systems were not heeded on the firm-level and wages continued to drift upwards, 
negating the moderation displayed at the centralised level and contributing to 
unemployment. For wage flexibility as an adjustment mechanism, however, this could 
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adjustment is possible, highly centralised wage bargaining systems are also 
desirable. 
 
Apart from centralisation, the degree of trade union organisation must be examined 
for its relevance for flexibility. A low degree of worker organisation (trade union 
membership) does not necessarily signal a more flexible wage bargaining process. If 
wage contracts concluded at firm level by a particular (group of) union(s) are 
frequently declared generally applicable across a whole sector (as has been the case 
in France) or are used as a guideline for the wage bargaining process in other 
sectors, a decentralised system has no advantage over a centralised system. Only 
the absence of generalisation of coverage and decentralised bargaining would 
then signify a greater shock adjustment capacity via increased wage flexibility. If 
these two conditions are fulfilled, the degree of organisation is not relevant for 
flexibility. 
 
Lastly, the degree of coordination in wage bargaining is significant. This is the 
extent to which employers and unions coordinate their wage bargaining activities 
(Nickell, 1997, p. 69). A high degree of such coordination prevents leapfrogging 
which drives wages up and is therefore more likely to result in unemployment. 
 
High geographical and job mobility is the form of labour market flexibility initially 
advocated by Robert Mundell (1961). It increases an economy’s ability to adjust to a 
shock while impacting to the least degree possible on the overall employment 
situation. Two types of mobility can be distinguished: On the one hand, mobility 
between jobs or even between types of activity; on the other hand, mobility between 
geographical locations of employment. The greater the willingness of people to 
engage in these types of mobility, the greater the shock adjustment capability of an 
economy. Pure willingness, however, does not suffice: structural elements have an 
influence on the degree of mobility. The main factor is high costs of hiring and firing. 
The greater the cost incurred by a firm for each new job created or shed, the greater 
is its incentive to keep its labour turnover low. Thus, reduced hiring and firing costs 
can increase labour mobility, especially between jobs. Mobility between activities can 
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entrants to the labour market or the unemployed with the necessary abilities to find 
employment in a sector where there are skills shortages.  
 
High  income taxes and benefits can have a detrimental effect on flexibility by 
affecting the incentive structure of the unemployed to look for work. If income taxes 
and unemployment benefit payments are both high, then the threshold from which 
employment pays sufficiently to induce movement from the pool of unemployed 
labour to the pool of employed labour is high. Thus, a greater level of labour market 
flexibility is achieved by providing the unemployed with incentives to look for a job as 
quickly as possible after they have become unemployed. Low unemployment benefits 
and special tax treatment to bring down the marginal tax rates for re-entrants are 
usually advocated to achieve an appropriate incentive structure. 
 
Geographical mobility can be increased by structural policies aimed at reducing the 
costs of moving from one location to another. The ability of policy action to influence 
these costs, however, is limited. Tassinopoulos et al (1998) split the costs of mobility 
into several categories, including work-related costs (need for retraining, loss of 
workers’ expertise in local preferences) and leisure-related costs (loss of family 
proximity, implications for social life). An important category is related to housing, 
where mortgage terms and property market rigidities or regulations restricting access 
to public housing are barriers to mobility. 
 
Finally, increasing working time flexibility is another way of reducing labour market 
rigidities. When prices in the labour markets are sticky and cannot respond to shocks, 
the adaptation of working time may act as adjustment mechanism. The possibility to 
adjust working times to allow a more continuous usage of productive capital can 
reduce costs and therefore act as a shock absorber. Thus, any legislation imposing 
time constraints on firms’ operations must be regarded with care. The same applies 
to legislation limiting the amount of time employees are allowed to work over a 
certain period (e.g. an average weekly working time over one year). The shorter the 
period defined in the legislation, the more restrictive it is. The greater the restrictions, 
the lower the possibilities of adjusting the duration of work to any shock, even 
temporarily. In the context of this study, we therefore need to look at two issues 
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  33
over a certain period of time compared to the average number of hours worked over 
the same period, and the length of the period over which the number of hours can be 
averaged. Clearly, the greater the difference between the permitted maximum and 
the actual
30 number of hours worked, the more room there is for adjustment when the 
optimal response of a firm to a shock is to increase the number of hours worked. 
Equally, the longer the period available for averaging of working time, the more 
flexible employers are to respond to any shocks. 
 
Some forms of employment contracts induce more flexibility in the labour markets 
than others. For example, part-time working (ideally negotiated between employer 
and employee to render the contract perfectly adapted to the needs of both) can help 
absorb some excess supply of labour because it contributes to a better matching of 
the demand to the supply side and therefore allows the reduction of market 
imbalances following a shock. The application of part-time working is however limited 
by a restricted willingness on the part of employees to engage in such contracts, 
which in some countries, including France, are regarded as ‘abnormal’ and 
‘precarious’. 
 
Working time flexibility also includes the use of fixed-term contracts. While the same 
criticisms as those applied to part-time contracts are frequently put forward in France, 
the use of fixed-term contracts can be viewed as a response to high hiring and firing 
costs applying to open-ended contracts. Because they usually do not apply to fixed-
term contracts, firms faced with this cost problem tend to resort to the latter. Fixed-
term contracts are thus a way of circumventing high hiring and firing costs by 
adjusting the working time factor. 
 
Active labour market and life-long learning policies can increase labour market 
flexibility by tackling the mismatch between the current and future pool of 
unemployed on one hand and vacancies through training or retraining of the jobless 
on the other. The more qualifications individuals hold, the more likely they are to be 
able to switch employment following an adverse shock affecting their job. By 
increasing workforce qualifications, ALMPs (for the unemployed) and policies 
                                                 
30 The actual number of hours worked is assumed here to be expressed by the average number of 
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promoting ‘life-long learning’ (for those in work) can positively contribute to an 
economy’s adjustment capability through the labour market. 
 
There are thus a large number of elements which can all increase flexibility in the 
labour market in such a way that there will be less impact on employment following 
an asymmetric shock, rendering EMU more sustainable. The second part of this 
chapter proceeds with the formal modelling of flexibility. 
•  Modelling flexibility 
 
Flexibility is usually modelled as a function of wage rigidity, which is its most 
straightforward feature. If wages adapted fully to a shock, there would be no need to 
focus on the other elements of labour market rigidity. Since this is not the case, wage 
and price stickiness needs to be accounted for in a separate variable and the other 
elements of flexibility need to be modelled in isolation.  
 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) model real and nominal wage rigidity in the 
following way. In a standard wage-setting equation and a price-setting equation, they 
relate the wage level (w) to the level of unemployment (u) and inflation (∆p): 
 
w - p = γ0 - γ1u - γ2 ∆p              
 
p - w = ß0 - ß1u - ß2 ∆p         
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so that the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) or natural rate of 








= u        
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The term ß1 + γ1 reflects the degree of real wage flexibility. The inverse reflects the 





= RWR  
 
Thus, the larger is RWR, the larger is unemployment. In order to make this model 
comprehensive, I make the assumption that the variables in the term (ß1 + γ1) allow 
for the degree of sectoral, regional and personal differences
31 to be accounted for in 
the assessment of flexibility, so that every ß1 = ßα + ßregional  + ßsectoral + ßpersonal. 
Equally, every γ1 = γα + γregional + γsectoral + γpersonal.  
 
Effecting a number of manipulations, the authors then arrive at an expression which 
allows them to relate unemployment to real wage rigidity (RWR), nominal inertia (NI = 
ß2 + γ2) – i.e. wage and price stickiness – and an ‘institutional structures‘ factor, z, 
which catches all other non-wage labour market rigidities and on which I will focus in 
the following. Thus,  
 
u = b ut-1 + (1-b) RWR (a0 + a1z - NI ∆m),  
 
where b is a hysteresis coefficient which is assumed to take a value lower than 1, 
and m is the logarithm of nominal GDP adjusted for trend growth. 
 
The model assumes that any asymmetric shocks only affect part of the EMU zone 
and no other part of the world, so that the exchange rate of the euro against an 
outside currency does not represent a viable adjustment tool and can therefore be 
ignored. Equally, EMU is assumed to be irrevocable, allowing the exclusion of the 
(effectively fixed) internal exchange rates. This makes sense because it is precisely 
the economy’s adjustment capability in the absence of the exchange rate we are 
trying to assess. 
 
                                                 
31 Personal differences refer to differences in individual workers, where they are in a position to 
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The degree of real wage rigidity depends on γ1, which shows what the effect on 
wages is of a move from one unemployment equilibrium to another. The greater γ1, 
the greater real wage flexibility. For the purposes of this model, I will assume that γ1 
is influenced positively by several factors which should be intuitive. Applying the 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988) hypothesis that either a large degree or a small degree of 
union centralisation is preferable to the intermediate solution, γ1 would be large if 
one of the two extremes was true. It would be smaller if this was not the case, 
accounting for the fact that in the latter situation, unemployment would not be taken 
into consideration in wage claims, resulting in their imperfect adjustment. This could 
be remedied by a high degree of coordination (DC), which would positively influence 
γ1 through its dampening effect on wage growth. Conversely, a higher degree of 
generalisation of coverage (GC) would relate negatively to γ1 because it would 
essentially negate the benefits achieved by decentralised wage bargaining practices.   
   
The degree by which benefit system generosity (length and relative level of support) 
will influence γ1 is not clear. The literature is split on the exact mechanisms benefit 
provision entails. While one part of the literature states that job search is made less 
attractive by prolonged benefit payments (essentially, the steady income flow lowers 
the incentive to search for jobs), the conflicting view is that on the contrary, 
continuous benefit payments allow job searchers to intensify their quest for a 
position, raising the probability of receiving a job offer. Another view is that continued 
benefit payments encourage continued job searching, but still entail longer spells of 
unemployment. The effect of benefit payments on the length of unemployment spells 
is therefore not conclusive and would depend on the exact provisions of the benefit 
system. For example, if benefit payments are conditional on job search activity, the 
second view is more likely. If this is not the case, the first view would be more 
appropriate. In the case of France, there have been suggestions that high 
unemployment benefits discourage job search activity (see chapter 4 below). 
 
Finally, I assume γ1  to be constrained by minimum wage legislation (the two are 
negatively related), which will prevent or slow the downward adjustment of wages, 
albeit only in the low-skilled segment of the labour market. γ1 is then related to the 
relative level of the minimum wage, weighted by the number of employees paid at or 
near this rate. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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The hysteresis coefficient b is assumed by the authors also to relate (positively) to 
the length of benefit payments and (negatively) to the degree of co-ordination, while 
nominal inertia (NI) is negatively related to wage flexibility. 
 
The remaining elements of flexibility will be modelled as influencing the variable of 
institutional rigidities, z, which takes crucial importance in this model, while in the 
original model it is more or less exogenous. The variable will firstly capture indicators 
of geographical and professional mobility, such as the latter’s elasticity
32 with 
respect to unemployment and wage differentials (both between regions and sectors). 
Clearly, z is negatively related to this elasticity because, as has been explained in 
detail above, the higher mobility (measured here by the elasticity), the greater the 
economy’s capacity to adjust to an asymmetric shock. Equally, all policies aimed at 
increasing mobility will tend to decrease z. 
 
Secondly, z will capture the incidence of non-wage labour costs (NWLCs). These, 
in turn, can be split into two major categories, namely taxes incurred on labour and 
the general costs incurred through employment protection legislation (EPL). Layard 
(1999) describes the issue of taxes in detail. Distinguishing between payroll taxes 
(taxes on labour) and consumption taxes (such as VAT), he makes the point that the 
latter are preferable to the former because they do not display a bias towards the 
taxation of labour but rather focus on the taxation of income. Clearly, any taxation 
applied to labour and not applied to income from other sources (unemployment 
benefits, capital gains) will put a negative bias on labour and make access to the 
labour market relatively less attractive, slowing the market’s ability to adjust smoothly. 
A tax on consumption is less distortive and should therefore be preferred to one on 
labour, implying that z is positively linked to the relative weight in the tax base of 
payroll against consumption taxes.  
 
Employment protection legislation refers to all kinds of regulations rendering the 
firing of employees difficult and therefore costly
33, impacting on firms’ hiring 
                                                 
32 This is an indicator proposed by Elliot (1991). 
33 It should be noted that Bertola (1990) challenges the view that job security provisions can be 
associated with higher labour costs and unemployment. He finds no empirical relationship between 
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behaviour as “hiring a worker becomes a somewhat irreversible decision” (Siebert, 
1997, p. 49). The comprehensive EPL indicator compiled by the OECD (1999c) 
includes such elements as procedural barriers to dismissal, the length of any notice 
periods, the statutory amount of severance pay, the definition of unfair dismissal and 
others. It is compiled in a summary score – ranging “from 0 to 6 with higher values 
representing stricter regulation” (OECD, 1999c, p. 57) – of overall strictness of 
protection against dismissals. Thus, z will be positively related to the magnitude of 
the EPL indicator because the greater the degree of EPL, the more costs a firm 
incurs when adjusting the size of its workforce and the less able and willing it is as a 
result to do so. z will also be positively related to the size of overheads. These 
increase, for example, due to bureaucratic administrative procedures associated with 
the hiring of an employee. 
 
Thirdly, z will be influenced by life-long learning policies. These are policies 
designed to encourage the training or retraining of workers to attain the qualifications 
required to take up existing or future vacancies. This will lead to more perfect 
matching, reducing unemployment spells and increasing the dynamism of an 
economy by improving the skills of the labour force. Thus, the more significant the 
use of life-long learning policies in an economy, the lower will be z. 
 
The last group of elements relates to working time flexibility. In this respect, a 
number of different types of policies exist and can interact in complex ways. The 
most obvious form of restriction concerns the weekly number of hours worked. Any 
rule on how long each individual employee can be active in any one week is 
necessarily restrictive. Firms cannot adjust their production (and therefore the 
number of hours they require their employees to work) to short-run fluctuations, 
creating excess unmet demand for short-run labour in the case of a positive shock, 
and excess supply of such labour in the opposite case. Normally, such laws include a 
number of provisions, however, that allow a certain degree of hours variability. One 
usual feature is the usage of overtime. Firms facing a positive short-run shock 
                                                                                                                                                         
nevertheless concedes that the high degree of unemployment persistence in Europe can be 
explained by the relatively high degree of EPL and also notes that job security provisions helped to 
alleviate the employment effects of the oil shocks. This somewhat proves the point which is made 
here, i.e. that higher EPL hinders firms from quickly adjusting to exogenous shocks by shedding 
labour (indeed, if this was not the case, the job security provisions would be useless) – thus 
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(seasonal or not) can usually resort, to a limited extent, to overtime. Workers then 
have to be compensated for HOT, the amount of time worked above the regular 
maximum weekly limit (HREG) and cannot work more than a total (or absolute) 
maximum weekly limit of hours (HMAX). This can be expressed in the following form: 
 
HMAX = HREG + HOT 
 
The lower (i.e. the more restrictive) HMAX, the greater will be z.  In the usual case 
where the maximum number of hours worked overtime is strictly limited over a long 
period of time (such as a year), however, resorting to overtime is not a viable solution 
except if shocks are very short-term or their incidence is small. Weekly working time 
restrictions may include provisions allowing the maximum number of hours worked 
per week to be understood as an average over a certain length of time. While weekly 
working time may still be limited by an overtime ceiling (HOT), this type of provision 
allows some more flexibility in the organisation of production according to 
requirements. Assuming that a firm aims to minimise fluctuations in its workforce to 
avoid hiring costs, the length of the period over which working time can be averaged 








where Hi is the number of hours worked in week i and a is the averaging period in 
weeks. A, then, is the average weekly number of hours worked over period a, where 
A is restricted by HMAX. Note that in the long run (i.e. over period a), the condition A < 
HMAX must hold, A tends towards HREG (but can be equal, higher or lower), and that 
HMAX can never be exceeded in any one week. Nevertheless, if HMAX is sufficiently 
generous to allow firms to increase their production following a shock
34 by 
temporarily producing above HREG, the length of the averaging period a will negatively 
influence z because it increases firms’ capability to adjust to short-run disturbances. 
The same reasoning applies to the weekly limit imposed over the averaging period, 
thus A is negatively related to z.  It should be clear that the greater the difference 
between maximum regular hours and maximum total hours including overtime, the 
                                                 
34 I assume here the absence of any HMIN legislation, which would increase rigidity in the case of 
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easier it is for a firm to adjust to a shock. Thus, the lower the ratio HREG/HMAX, the 
less working time flexibility a firm is subject to. HREG/HMAX is negatively related to z. 
However, overtime wages must be taken into consideration as well, as excessive 
overtime payments may put prohibitive costs on a firm wishing to run at overtime. 
Hence, the greater the difference between regular wages (wREG) and overtime wages 
(wOT), the greater will be z.  
 
Lastly, restrictions on the extent to which part-time, temporary and fixed-term work 
contracts can be used by companies increase z. Such contracts represent more 
flexible forms of working, often dealing away with the problems posed by regular 
employment contracts, notably hiring and firing and other employment protection 
legislation, and may also provide more flexibility on the times of day worked. 
 
Table 3.2 below sums up this simple model, which will form the basis of the analysis 
of the Aubry law’s effects on labour market flexibility in France and the implications 
for the sustainability of EMU. The preceding analysis can be summarised in the 
following equations which illustrate the relationships between the different elements 
of labour market flexibility and the ‘institutional rigidities‘ variable z. In addition, the 
variables influencing γ1 can be put together in a formula. 
 




PT  + ϕ2 O + ϕ3 EPL + ϕ4 (wOT - wREG) + ϕ5 RAWC] 










w  nMIN) + χ2 GBS] 
 
where ϕ1,…11 and χ1, 2 are the relative weights of the individual flexibility elements 
(their sum will be 1); α0 and γ’0 are constants; and α1, γ’1 and γ’2 – as well as (1-α0-α1) 
– the relative weights of the groups of explanatory variables (their sum will also be 1). 
Any error terms are omitted.  
 
These equations show that labour market flexibility is composed of a significant 
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mobility is not sufficient for the analysis of labour market structures. There are far 
more factors influencing flexibility. In the next chapter, the effects of the French law 
on the tendency of each identified variable will be examined. 
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Table 3.2: The main relationships between the variables of the model and z 
Instrument 
 








Elasticity of mobility with respect to 
unemployment rate and wage differentials 





Non-wage labour costs 
 
Taxes: Relative weight in the tax base of payroll 








Overheads: Large overheads cause labour to 






Degree of employment protection legislation as 










Working time regulation 
 





Length of averaging period and maximum limit of 
hours worked over the averaging period (if 
different from HMAX) 




Relation between maximum weekly hours and 








Difference between regular and overtime wages 





Restrictions on ‘abnormal’ work contracts  
RAWC   
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Table 3.3: The main determinants of γ1   
Instrument  Indicator and formal expression 
 




If union centralisation is very high (c=1) or very low 
(c=-1), the effect on x is positive, otherwise (c=0) it is 
negative 
x = (-1) +2 |c|, where c can take values -1, 0 or 1 and 
x can take the result -1 or 1. x is then positively 
related to γ1. 
 
Positive function of x 
 
 
Generalisation of coverage (GC) counteracts all 





The higher the degree of coordination (DC), the less 





Generosity of benefit systems and job search efforts 
are negatively related. 
GBS 
  
Unclear, but likely 
to be negative 
Minimum wage 
 
Minimum wage laws increase real wage rigidity for 
employees paid at or near the minimum rate (nMIN is 
their number as a percentage of the total workforce). 
The relationship gains significance, the higher the 




w  nMIN 
 
Negative 
* Note that γ1 is negatively related to RWR 
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Chapter 4: The Aubry law and labour market flexibility 
 
 
This chapter analyses in more detail the effects of the Aubry law on the defining 
components of labour market flexibility, relating each one of them to the model 
developed in the previous chapter. 
 
•  Geographical and professional mobility 
 
The Aubry law does not include any provisions designed to increase either type of 
mobility, nor does it include any measures which are susceptible of having the same 
effect, even unplanned. It is therefore reasonable to assume that flexibility will not be 
affected via this channel as a result of the new legislation (refer, however, to the 
potential effects of life-long learning policies below): 
 
∆z[ε (µU,d(w))] = 0 (
35) 
 
•  Non-wage labour costs 
 
As has been shown, the French law provides for job subsidies for all businesses 
implementing the 35-hour week in the form of lower social security contributions and 
are made up of two distinct elements. The first is a permanent yearly subsidy of 
FRF4,000 per employee
36 for all firms implementing the law and not receiving any 
other aid in connection with it. The second element is a reduction in social security 
charges on low incomes, designed to lower the net cost of labour and exceeding the 
amount necessary to compensate firms for the wage increase implicit in the reduction 
of working time at wages constant due to minimum wage legislation. In this case, 
downward adjustment of wages is impossible. Table 4.1 illustrates the sum of both 
                                                 
35 The expressions in the following should be read as “the change in z induced by…” For our analysis, 
it is sufficient to determine whether the effect will be positive, negative or neutral. 
36 This applies to all employees, not just those hired as a result of the working time reduction. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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subsidies according to the wage level and compares them to the subsidies available 
before the introduction of the new law. 
 
Table 4.1: Total amount of social security reductions for firms at 35 hours 
Level of minimum wage 
(SMIC) 
Reduction before the law 
(in FRF per year
Reduction after the law 
and per employee) 
1.0 SMIC  15,000  21,500 
1.1 SMIC  10,000  17,700 
1.2 SMIC  5,000  14,600 
1.3 SMIC  0  11,900 
1.4 SMIC  0  9,600 
1.5 SMIC  0  7,700 
1.6 SMIC  0  5,900 
1.7 SMIC  0  4,400 
1.8 SMIC  0 4,000 
Source: Ministère du Travail, www.35h.travail.gouv.fr 
 
 
The new subsidies are available for an unlimited time and are subject to yearly 
revaluation based on price and wage developments. The table shows that the new 
subsidies reduce the cost of low-wage labour significantly more than before the law 
was introduced. Thus, the level of payroll taxation is reduced for those firms that 
adopt the 35-hour week and all other provisions of the law; non-respect of these is 
sanctioned by increased social security payments. As a result, PTTB is reduced by the 
new legislation, and seeing that the latter does not include any change regarding the 
taxation of consumption, the relative weight of payroll taxes in the overall tax base 






PT ) < 0 (negative) 
 
Chapter 2 (page Error! Bookmark not defined.) mentions that only part of the 
additional costs caused by the Aubry law is picked up by the subsidies, and this 
ignores the costs incurred by the increased bureaucracy (FT, 2000). Seeing that 
instant cost absorption through productivity gains is improbable, firms will – at least 
initially – be faced with increased overheads, so that the law increases average 
labour costs, increasing z in the short run (i.e. until the additional costs have been 
absorbed by productivity gains). Thus,  ∆z(O) > 0 (positive). 
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•  Restrictions on ‘abnormal work contracts’ 
 
The above reductions in social security contributions also apply to part-time 
workers
37 who decide to work less as a result of the law; equally, temporary workers 
are eligible provided the reduction in contributions accrues to the firm benefiting from 
the employee’s work, rather than the employment agency. This is significant on two 
accounts. Firstly, this provision shows that these types of working arrangements are 
consistent with the government’s employment plans, an observation running counter 
to a generally perceived attitude in France
38. Secondly, it also shows that this change 
in political preferences has resulted in a relative treatment of these types of contracts 
which is not less favourable than before the introduction of the law, despite political 
pressure to reduce the usage of such types of working. As a result, RAWC does not 
change in this model. 
 
∆z(RAWC) = 0  
 
•  Employment Protection Legislation 
 
Administrative restrictions to job turnover have generally been relatively high in 
France, but have not figured amongst the strictest in European cross-country 
comparison. Furthermore, French EPL has not generally tended to increase, but has 
largely remained at the same level between the late 1980s and the late 1990s. The 
OECD (1999c, p. 57) summarises the indicators of EPL strictness for regular 
employment for these two periods, distinguishing four main areas: regular procedural 
inconveniences, notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals, difficulty 
of dismissal, and overall strictness of protection against dismissals. Table 4.2 below 
shows the OECD’s results for the French labour market, with summary scores 
ranging from 0 to 6, where higher values represent stricter regulation
39.  
 
                                                 
37 Provided their regular working time is equal or superior to half  the regular full working time  
38 The frequent references to ‘abnormal types of work’ and ‘emplois précaires’ illustrate this attitude 
well. 
39 For more information regarding the calculation of these scores, refer to the Annex of OECD (1999c). Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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Table 4.2: OECD indicators of EPL strictness for France (country ranking) 
Regular procedural 
inconveniences 
Notice and severance 
pay for no-fault 
individual dismissals 




































Source: OECD (1999c), p. 57. Parentheses report country rankings, No. 1 = least EPL strictness 
 
The more interesting value for the present study, however, is the country ranking 
assigned to France. Comparing the two periods of analysis, it is striking that while the 
strictness indicator has practically not changed between periods, the country has 
fallen in the relative OECD country ranking in all four categories. This illustrates the 
rigidity of French employment legislation and would indicate a need for reform in this 
area. Meanwhile, the Aubry law does not foresee any amendment to employment 
protection legislation as such. Positive indirect effects could arise if the 
implementation of the law leads to the usage of more fixed-term contracts, which are 
easy to terminate at the end of the contracted term. We will neglect this possibility 
and conclude that no direct change in EPL is foreseen. Thus, 
 
 ∆z(EPL) = 0. 
•  Active Labour Market Policies and provisions for life-long learning 
 
“Life-long learning” has been praised in recent time as one of the ways to reduce 
unemployment. By providing education and (re)training to individuals, the workforce 
becomes more polyvalent and able to move between jobs. This means that the job 
mobility potential is greatly increased and so is the capacity to adjust in the face of an 
adverse shock.   
 
Workforce polyvalence is favoured by the Aubry law, which provides for the 
possibility of worker training, partly during working time and partly during employees’ 
free time. In this way, the law aims to encourage employees to use more of the time 
freed up by the hours reduction for educational purposes.  
 
The training cost is to be paid entirely by either the employer or special professional 
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possible, lead to a professional qualification, which supports the argument that this 
will increase employees’ job-switching potential. Thus,  
 
∆z(LLL) < 0 (negative): 
 
The law provides for life-long learning programmes liable to reduce future structural 
rigidities due to skills mismatch in the French labour market. Given that these policies 
are voluntary, however, the uptake rate is likely to remain relatively low, so that the 
negative effect on z may be small. 
•  Working time regulation 
Restrictions on weekly hours worked 
 
Despite the fact that the Aubry law sets the regular working week at 35 hours, 
overtime working is permitted up to a limit of 48 hours. This is the limit set down by 
the European Working Time Directive, which was applied even before the 
introduction of the French law, so that the maximum limit remains unchanged. 
Derogations to this regulation are possible in specific cases. Thus, HMAX remains 
constant and there is neither a positive nor a negative impact on this type of flexibility: 
∆z(HMAX) = 0 
 
Conversely, the value of the relation (HREG/HMAX)  decreases as a result of the 






H ) > 0 (positive) 
 
The 35-hour restriction imposes greater rigidity on the labour market. 
 
Length of averaging period 
 
For the calculation of the average weekly working time, an averaging period of up to 
a year is permitted. This is however subject to an additional averaging rule imposing Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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a maximum weekly average of 44 hours (A) over twelve consecutive weeks (a). 
While the length of the period has not changed, the number of hours has been 
reduced by two. Thus, while variable a remains constant, A is reduced, so that 
 
∆z(a) = 0 and ∆z(A) < 0 (negative). 
Regulations concerning overtime wages 
 
The two-tiered implementation of the law requires a staggered application of overtime 
regulations; the old regulations still apply to smaller businesses, while larger ones are 
already subjected to the new rules, according to which overtime payments are 
triggered as soon as the weekly working time exceeds 35 hours. The compensation 
rates are summarised in Table 4.3 below. In addition, each employee disposes of an 
overtime allowance of 130 hours yearly (this has not changed); every hour beyond 
this threshold is subject to an additional 100% compensation in free time. The 
threshold is reduced to 90 hours for those firms making use of working time 
annualisation – effectively penalising companies having opted for the more flexible 
approach to working time limitation. 
 
Table 4.3: Compensation rates for overtime working (in percent of HREG) 
 
 
First 4 hours  Next 4 hours  Additional hours 
 
Before 35h law 
 
25% 
(H40 to H43) 
25% 









(H36 to H39) 
25% 
(H40 to H43) 
50% 
(from H44) 
Source: Ministère du Travail, www.35h.travail.gouv.fr 
 
Table 4.3 illustrates statutory overtime compensation before and after the 
introduction of the law. The two differ on only two accounts: firstly, the threshold has 
changed so that overtime payments kick in earlier (HREG is reduced). Secondly, in the 
first year of application of the new law
40 overtime payments for the first four hours 
(i.e. the difference between HREG(new) and HREG(old)) are reduced to 10% to aid firms 
with the transition to the new working arrangements. If this transitory period is 
                                                 
40 The first year of application for businesses with more than 20 employees is 2000, for all others it is 
2002. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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ignored
41, it can be asserted that the relative cost of overtime remains constant with 
the introduction of the law; in other words, the difference (wOT - wREG) remains 
unchanged, so that  
 
∆z [(wOT - wREG)] = 0. 
 
It should be noted that this is true even if the working time reduction is accompanied 
by full wage compensation, effectively representing a rise in wages, as overtime 
payments are expressed in percentages.  
 
It has been shown that the ‘institutional rigidities’ variable z is influenced by a large 
number of elements. These are summarised in Table 4.4. It is interesting to note that 
the Aubry law affects three determinants of z in a way such that institutional rigidities 
are reduced, while two of them have rigidifying effects, one of which applies only in 
the short run. Although this study does not attach relative weightings to the individual 
elements of flexibility, this would suggest that the Aubry law could in fact have a 
positive effect on the reduction of institutional rigidities in the French labour market.  
 
                                                 
41 This is reasonable given that its short duration of one year is unlikely to induce businesses to adapt 
their behaviour. Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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The effects of the law on real wage flexibility are less clear. In the following, we will 
proceed with the analysis of the elements influencing γ1.    
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•  Wage bargaining and union structure 
 
The degree of union centralisation is, according to Calmfors and Driffill (1988)
42, 
relevant for the determination of wage flexibility. Very high or very low union 
centralisation has positive effects on flexibility, while an intermediate position 
encourages leapfrogging and has negative flexibility effects. Thus, the calculations in 
Table 3.3 allow us to determine the relationship between union centralisation and 
wage flexibility with the help of an intermediate variable, x.  It uses the degree of 
centralisation (c) as input, where c can take the value –1 (minimum centralisation), 0 
(intermediate centralisation), or 1 (maximum centralisation). Figure 4.1 shows how 
these values are assigned. 
 


















Source: Diagram inspired by Pier-Carlo Padoan and based on Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
 
By using the equation shown in Table 3.3
43, we arrive at an outcome for x of either    
–1 or 1, which is positively related to γ1 (i.e. negatively related to RWR). Thus, the 
closer the economy is to either of the two extremes of centralisation, the better this is 
for real wage flexibility. 
 
                                                 
42 For a more detailed description, refer to Chapter 3. 
43 The purpose of this expression (x = (-1) +2 |c|) is purely to arrive at a value tending towards  either –
1 or 1, indicating the tendency of the degree of trade union centralisation/decentralisation to reduce 
or increase wage flexibility, respectively. 
 Degree of union centralisation (c)
         LOW       INTERMEDIATE         HIGH
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The Aubry law is based on the premise that the working time reduction and the 
related details, such as wage implications, need to be negotiated at firm or sectoral 
level. This is to be seen in the context of the French labour market, where co-
operative wage negotiations between employers and employees do not form part of 
the usual habits, and where union behaviour has been rather centralised through the 
existence of provisions ensuring generalised coverage of lead settlements. If the law 
succeeds in prompting a general movement to more decentralised and co-ordinated 
negotiation, this means that the economy is moving towards the value of –1 in terms 
of Figure 4.1. The evidence suggests that this is in fact the case: 26,618 firm-level 
agreements (covering 3 million employees) and 132 sectoral agreements (covering 
10 million employees) had been reached until March 2000
44. While sectoral 
agreements correspond to the intermediate level of bargaining, and would therefore 
be seen as bad according to Calmfors and Driffill, they are subject to renegotiation at 
the firm level where this is required, effectively providing a framework for negotiation. 
In fact, only 20% of all companies subject to a sectoral agreement have applied it 
without any modification to tailor it to firm-specific requirements
45. Thus, a more 
decentralised and more co-ordinated wage bargaining structure seems to be attained 
in France. This could lead to more wage flexibility, so that 
 
∆γ1 (x) > 0 (positive), where x = (–1) + 2 |c|, with c tending towards (–1), 
∆γ1 (DC) > 0 (positive) 
∆γ1 (GC) = 0.  
 
The change in the negotiating structure in the French economy may be the biggest 
improvement brought about by the Aubry law. If it leads to continued decentralisation 
by establishing a durable negotiation relationship between employers and employees 
(co-ordination), and the practice of generalisation of coverage is reduced, this is likely 
to increase overall wage flexibility in the French labour market. 
                                                 
44 Data available from www.35h.travail.gouv.fr 
45 Data available from www.35h.travail.gouv.fr Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
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•  Benefit systems 
 
No changes in the system of unemployment assistance are currently planned to 
accompany the efforts to reduce working time. The absence of such efforts has 
prompted criticism especially from employers’ associations, who in April 2000 “put 
forward ambitious back-to-work proposals that both provide incentives for those on 
unemployment benefit to seek jobs and threaten to penalise those who fail to take 
advantage of job offers” (FT, 2000, p. 2). It can therefore be asserted that there is an 
absence of benefit reform susceptible of increasing labour market flexibility: 
∆γ1 (GBS) = 0  
 
•  Minimum wage regulations 
 
Minimum wage rules increase the downward flexibility of wages for those workers 
paid at or near the minimum level. Two aspects are important to assess the impact 
on wage flexibility of such regulations: firstly, the amount of workers paid at or near 
the minimum wage as a proportion of the total workforce (nMIN) – the greater this 
proportion, the less wages will be flexible downwards. Secondly, the level of the 
minimum wage relative to the average wage is significant: the greater this ratio, the 
higher the minimum wage and the likelihood of its interfering with the adjustment 
capacity of the wage. Thus, the greater the product of the two (and the closer it is to 
1), the lower will be γ1 (and the greater will be RWR). The value for France is 0.17
46, 
which does not seem overly high. 
 
The Aubry law does not include any provisions relating to the minimum wage level, 
nor does it explicitly change the number of workers employed at SMIC level. It is, 
however, conceivable that the prescribed reduction in hours could lead to a greater 
proportion of (at least newly) employed workers being paid at SMIC level (the 
reduction in hours being compensated by lower starting wages, which will lead to a 
greater proportion of employees being paid at the minimum). Thus, nMIN will increase 
to give 
 
                                                 






w nMIN) < 0 (negative). 
 
Table 4.5 summarises the effects of the law on the variable γ1. Two opposing forces 
are found to act on real wage rigidity: While union decentralisation and an increased 
degree of coordination tend to lower it on one hand, the fact that the working time 
reduction may lead to more new workers being employed at SMIC level tends to 
increase rigidity. However, the latter effect is likely to be less significant than the first 
two because it affects a relatively small number of employees, while the wage 
bargaining process and union structure cover almost the entire economy. 
 








Effects on γ1 
 
 















Degree of coordination 
 


































* Union centralisation is represented by variable c, which is included in x. Refer to text for details. 
 
It can be concluded that the Aubry law has the potential to introduce more labour 
market flexibility by influencing two variables of the model presented here: 
Institutional rigidities and wage flexibility. The first variable is worsened by two 
aspects of the law, namely the increase in administrative costs imposed on firms and 
the restriction of weekly working time. These may be compensated for, however, by 
the other aspects of the law influencing the labour market in a more positive way:  
The tax system will focus less on labour and more on consumption, life-long learning 
policies will reduce mismatch and the working time restriction is alleviated by a Labour market flexibility and EMU sustainability: The effects of the French working time reduction 
  56
relatively generous averaging period. The law’s effects on wage rigidity are more 
ambiguous. While it is likely to have a positive influence on the bargaining structure in 
wage negotiations in France, it may increase the number of workers perceiving the 
downward rigid minimum wage. The effect on the bargaining structure is, however, 
likely to outweigh the second one because it concerns a larger number of employees. 
The Aubry law may in fact hide its positive effects on labour market flexibility behind 




There are important labour market issues to be tackled if EMU is to be sustainable in 
the long run. The OCA Theory criterion of labour market flexibility informs on the 
important adjustment role played by the labour market in monetary union. Two 
aspects are important when considering the relationship between the labour market 
and EMU sustainability. Persistent high unemployment rates may cause an 
asymmetric shift of preferences from a stabilising monetary policy to an employment-
creating monetary expansion. This would almost certainly lead to the break-up of 
EMU. To render it sustainable, unemployment needs to be lowered durably. The 
Aubry law is intended to do this, but as chapter 2 demonstrates, the legislation’s 
employment-creating effects may be disappointing, not least due to the serious 
theoretical flaws underlying its argumentation. Any policy targeting job creation 
through indirect measures such as sharing out existing levels of work are likely to be 
second-best options. If employment creation – subsidised or not – is the prime target 
of the law, this could have been better achieved through more direct measures.  
 
The second issue relevant for EMU sustainability is labour market flexibility, which 
plays an important adjustment role in the case of idiosyncratic shocks. On the face of 
it, a law restricting the weekly number of working hours would seem to be a move in 
the wrong direction and actually rigidify the labour market. The results of this study, 
however, are counterintuitive: the Aubry law includes a number of provisions that 
may contribute to a flexibilisation of the French labour market. In fact, it introduces a 
greater number of measures increasing flexibility than reducing it. While the relative 
magnitudes of the individual variables’ importance remain to be seen, the legislation 
could be a Trojan-horse policy to introduce more suppleness into a labour market 
where union, political and public opinion is extremely opposed to the notion of 
increased flexibility. 
 
The reduction of payroll taxes relative to consumption taxes and the life-long learning 
policies brought about by the law could have been implemented without the working 
time reduction. This would have been a first-best solution. But the measures of 
flexibilisation, and especially the move towards a culture of more wage negotiation 
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some political counterweight to convince voters that an increased degree of flexibility 
was not imposed upon them without some sort of reward. The policy has been 
heavily sold on its employment-creating effects (an issue close to the hearts of many 
French voters) and its positive effects on the quality of life arising from a greater 
amount of free time. The measures introducing more flexibility have hardly been 
touched upon. This strengthens the view that the Aubry law is a ‘stealth’ policy to 
introduce more labour market flexibility. 
 
This has important consequences for the future of EMU. The French practice shows 
that even if voters are opposed to measures increasing labour market flexibility – for 
fear of job security loss –, there are ways to prepare labour markets for their role as 
shock adjustment mechanism for monetary union. These ways are not first-best 
options. But EMU is not doomed due to political deadlock on labour market reform. 
More flexibility can be achieved. It is now up to the other euro-11 countries to find the 
second-best options that will allow them to prepare their labour markets for the 
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Annex 1 – Minimum wages 
 
At the time of writing, the statutory minimum wage (SMIC) was at FRF6881.68 per 
month. 
 
Average annual earnings, as communicated in the series Tableaux de l’économie 
française (1999/2000 edition) were FRF131,120. 
 
Thus, the annual SMIC was FRF82,580.16. This yields a value for (wMIN/wAV) of 0.63. 
 
The share of workers paid at or near
47 the SMIC is reported by INSEE (1999) as 
27.2% of the total workforce (1996 figure). 
 
As a result, the product [(wMIN/wAV) nMIN] equals 0.17. 
 
                                                 
47 This includes workers paid at up to 1.33 SMIC. 